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It is widely accepted that to be 
naturalised one must acquire the 
nationality of a political or national 
community, and that such a status is 
accompanied by various rights. It is also 
widely accepted that nationality can be 
acquired in various ways. Article 34 of 
the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees 
provides that States must facilitate the 
naturalisation and assimilation of 
refugees and expedite these proceedings 
as far as possible.  As South Africa has not 
filed any reservations to the UN Refugee 
Convention, it is bound to respect Article 
34 of this treaty and thus not block the 
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pathway to naturalisation. Failure to do so means that South Africa is violating its 
obligations under international law.  There is a legal pathway to ending refugee status in 
South Africa; however, it is bound by a complicated process regulated by three different 
pieces of legislation , namely, the Refugees Act, the Immigration Act, and the Citizenship 
Act. It therefore appears that South Africa has not enacted this provision in good faith. 
This article provides an analysis of South Africa’s domestication of Article 34 of the UN 
Refugee Convention. Moreover, it  concludes that the current system is complicated and 
hinders refugees from accessing naturalisation, and therefore is not in the spirit of the UN 
Refugee Convention 
 









The state of refugeehood provides “surrogate protection”1 but is not considered a 
durable solution because refugees do not automatically acquire the nationality of a host 
State. They may enjoy a range of rights as refugees, but they are excluded from 
belonging to the political community and therefore do not have a normal citizen-State 
relationship. 2 Moreover, they no longer have the protection of their home State or the 
citizenship rights they once had. Regular migrants, on the other hand, even if they 
remain migrants, have a choice: they can come and go from host States as they please 
and re-establish the citizen-State bond with their home States.3  When refugees are 
expected to remain refugees, they are deprived of a citizenship bond with any State. It is 
for this reason that the concept of durable solutions is continuously developed by the 
UNHCR.4 The international community has recognised the injustices and prejudices 
suffered when refugees are forced to live in protracted refugee situations, and this has 
 
 
1 Hathaway J C & Foster M The law of refugee status 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014) 
at 495. 
2 This article views a citizen as someone “ who enjoys the full panoply of rights—civil, social, economic, 
and political—accorded by a nation state; a citizen can call on his or her nation state, and only that nation 
state, to claim diplomatic protection; and the nation state can in turn demand the ultimate loyalty of its 
citizens, including the obligation to fight and die”.   Hansen R “State controls: borders, refugees, and 
citizenship”       in   Fiddian-Qasmiyeh E, Loescher G, Long K &  Sigona N (eds) The Oxford handbook of 
refugee and forced migration studies (Oxford : OUP 2014) 253. 
3 Teitelbaum M “The role of the state in international migration” (2002) 8 The Brown Journal of World 
Affairs  157 at 167. 
4 UNHCR "Refugee protection and mixed migration: the point plan in action" (2007) available at 
https://www.unhcr.org/50a4c2b09.pdf  (accessed 17 February 2017). 
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been widely studied.5 States, scholars and the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR)  have also acknowledged the temporariness of refugee status6 and 
that only re-attachment to a home State through repatriation or the host State through 
naturalisation or third country resettlement 7will lead to a citizenship bond with a State 
for the refugee.8  
 
This article  begins by examining the only durable solution which signifies an end 
to refugeehood in the host State by the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (UN Refugee Convention)9 in Article 34. Furthermore, it provides an 
analysis of South Africa’s commitment to Article 34 and argues that the current three 
step system, spread across three legislative acts, is paved with obstacles and in fact 
hinders refugees from accessing naturalisation. It also posits that if South Africa is to 
truly adhere to Article 34 in good faith, the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs 
(SCRA) that is responsible for the first and vital step toward naturalisation in terms of 
the Refugees Act needs to guarantee efficiency, stand autonomously as an independent 
body, and interpret refugee law concepts in accordance with current international 
jurisprudence. This article also objects to the cumbersome and prejudicial process 
which sees permanent residency and naturalisation proceedings removed from the 
protection of refugee law and placed under the operation of immigration law and 
citizenship law, respectively. This article thus concludes that South Africa has not 
committed to Article 34 in the spirit of the UN Refugee Convention which calls for an 
expedited process and one that will be beneficial to the refugee.  
 
2 ARTICLE 34 OF THE UN REFUGEE CONVENTION: AN ANALYSIS  
 
Article 34 is the closest that the UN Refugee Convention gets to a solution to ending 
refugeehood in a host State. It states:  
“The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite 
 
5For example, see: Loescher, Milner J, Newman E & Troeller G (eds) Protracted refugee situations: political, 
human rights and security implications (Tokyo, New York, Paris : UN University Press 2008) at 
3;  Konyndyk J “Towards a new model for post-emergency refugee assistance” Human Practice 
Network (2005) G18 available  at http://odihpn.org/magazine/towar\ds-a-new-model-for-post-
emergency-refugee-assistance/ (accessed 28 November 2017) ; United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Committee Conclusion No 109 (LXI) on Protracted Refugee Situations 
(2009) UN GA Doc A/AC.96/1080; Loescher G & Milner J “Case studies: contemporary protracted 
refugee populations in Africa and Asia” (2005) 45 The Adelphi Papers at 35.  
6 Loescher G The UNHCR in world politics: a perilous path (Oxford: OUP 2001) at 75 (citing van Heuven   
Goedhart G J  “Refugee problems and their solutions”  ( address of UNHCR at Oslo on 12-12-1955). 
7The UNHCR only facilitates resettlement if it ends refugee status. See UNHCR “Resettlement Handbook” 
(2011). 
8 Haddad E The refugee in international society: between sovereigns (Cambrid\ge: Cambridge University 
Press 2008) at 34. 
9 189 UNTS 150.   
ART 34 OF THE UN REFUGEE CONVENTION 
 
Page | 71  
 
naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs 
of such proceedings.”10 
The Article requires States to facilitate assimilation and naturalisation, terms that 
are not defined in the Convention. It is trite that the word naturalisation11 has a distinct 
bearing on immigration status, whereas assimilation does not. Assimilationist policies 
are generally viewed in a negative sense because, in their worst f\orm, a State could put 
extreme pressure on minorities to relinquish their culture and adopt the culture of the 
State to ensure a homogenous national identity.12 Assimilation is often understood as 
conforming to the norms and ideals of the host State in order to fully become an 
accepted member of society.13 Integration allows for cultural differences and occurs 
when different groups in society can co-exist as equals.14  Commentators agree that the 
drafters of the UN Refugee Convention intended assimilation to be understood in the 
sense of integration into the economic, social and cultural life of the host community 
without forcing refugees to forsake their own culture and way of life.15 Hence, the 
preferred term by the UNHCR today is “integration” rather than “assimilation.”16 
However, this has not been adopted into law. Since the UNHCR is not calling for refugees 
to relinquish their identity, it might be worth reconsidering the legal phrasing in the UN 
Refugee Convention. The UNHCR has however formalised its use of the term integration 
in various guidelines and executive committee conclusions.17  
 
Naturalisation, on the other hand, guarantees nationality and membership of a 
political or national community and is accompanied by various rights and State 
obligations. Nationality can be acquired in various ways.18 For refugees, Article 34 of the 
UN Refugee Convention envisions that States will implement an effective and respectful 
pathway to naturalisation that is specific to refugees, and thus end their refugee status.  
It is not a self-executing Article. The Article calls for States to facilitate the process “as 
 
10 Art 34 of UN Refugee Convention. 
11 Manby B Citizenship law in Africa: a comparative study 3rd ed ( New York: Open Society Foundations 
2016) at xi. Nationality is usually conferred on a person at birth either because the person is born in a 
territory or because one or both of their parents possess the nationality in question. Nationality may also 
be conferred upon a person later by an application filed by the individual seeking to be naturalised. In the 
case of a refugee, this would largely be the case.   
12 Brown S K & Bean F D “Assimilation models, old and new: explaining a long-term process” (2006) 
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/assimilation-models-old-and-new-explaining-long-
term-process (accessed 22 October 2016). 
13 Snauwaert B, Soenens B, Vanbeselaere N & Boen F "When integration does not necessarily imply 
integration: different conceptualizations of acculturation orientations lead to different classifications" 
(2003) 34 Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 231 at 231. 
14 Kuhlman T "The economic integration of refugees in developing countries: a research model" (1991) 4 
Journal of Refugee Studies 1 at 3. 
15 See Brown & Bean (2006) . 
16 UNHCR Executive Committee “Conclusion no 104 (lvi) on local integration” (2005) UN GA Doc 
a/ac/.96/1021 7 October 2005. 
17 UNHCR Executive Committee "Local integration and self-reliance" (2005) available at  
https://www.unhcr.org/excom/standcom/42a0054f2/local-integration-self-reliance.html (accessed 18 
February 2019).  
18  See Manby (2016). 
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far as possible”; thus States are not held accountable to one specific standard of 
implementation.  
 
  Although assimilation and naturalisation may be two distinct processes, there is 
a nexus between them. Article 34 mentions assimilation first, which potentially 
indicates that this process must occur prior to the facilitation of naturalisation.  
Similarly, the UNHCR does not equate local integration with naturalisation but  does 
refer to it as a durable solution.19 Hathaway refers to it as a bifurcated approach to 
naturalisation,20 because local integration and naturalisation require a separate legal 
analysis. Since the UNHCR regards local integration as a durable solution for refugees 
even though it does not signify an end to refugeehood, and because of its link to Article 
34, an analysis of the concept of local integration follows. 
 
3 IS LOCAL INTEGRATION THE EQUIVALENT OF NATURALISATION?  
 
According to the UNHCR,  
“[i]ntegration requires preparedness on the part of the refugees to adapt to the 
host  society, without having to forego their own cultural identity as is generally 
expected of assimilation. From the host society, local integration requires 
communities to be welcoming and responsive to refugees, and public institutions 
that are able to meet the needs of the diverse population”.21  
 
Local integration has three specific dimensions – legal, economic, and socio-
cultural.22 In terms of the legal dimension, refugees are granted durable residence with 
a progressively wider range of rights that are equivalent to those granted to citizens, 
except for the right to vote. These rights include, amongst others, freedom of movement, 
access to the labour market, access to public relief and assistance, access to healthcare 
and education, the right to travel and identity documents, as well as the right to family 
unity,23 which ought to lead to the social and economic integration of refugees. Local 
integration, as envisaged by the UNHCR, provides a wide range of rights to refugees that 
can facilitate their  integration into the host community. According to the UNHCR, the 
range of the rights available ought to allow the refugee to live a meaningful life in the 
host State.24  
 
 
19 UNHCR  “Local integration” available at  https://www.unhcr.org/local-integration-49c3646c101.html  
(accessed 14 June 2019). 
20 Hathaway J C The rights of refugees under international law (Cambridge: C\ambridge University Press 
2005) at 978. 
21 UNHCR Executive Committee (2005) 
22 UNHCR Executive Committee “Local integration and self-reliance” (33rd Meeting, 2 June 2005) 
EC/55/SC/CRP.15 paras 19-24. 
23 UNHCR ExCom “Local integration and self-reliance” (2005) paras 11 and 19. 
24 UNHCR ExCom “Conclusion on local integration” No 104 (LVI) (2005) A/AC.96/1021. 
ART 34 OF THE UN REFUGEE CONVENTION 
 
Page | 73  
 
According to Hathaway, “[l]ocal integration means in essence that a refugee is 
granted some form of durable legal status that allows him or her to remain in the 
country of asylum on an indefinite basis, and fully participate in the social, economic, 
and cultural life of the host community”.25  So conceived, he says, local integration is not 
really distinguishable from the primary solution envisaged by the UN Refugee 
Convention which is simple respect for rights.26Yet, the UNHCR Executive Committee’s 
Conclusion on Local Integration refers to local integration as one of three durable 
solutions for refugees. The other two are resettlement27 and voluntary repatriation, 
which differ from local integration because they signify the end of refugee status. 28 
Local integration without the possibility of termination of refugee status can thus lead 
to an anomalous situation of a permanent refugee status. Therefore, the UNHCR’s 
reference to local integration as a durable solution29 is especially problematic. While 
local integration is necessary to access a vast range of rights, it is insufficient on its own 
as a solution as it does not lead to the end of refugeehood. Despite referring to local 
integration as a durable solution, there is no evidence that the UNHCR has replaced 




4 NATURALISATION - SIGNIFIES AN END TO REFUGEE STATUS IN THE HOST 
STATE 
Citizenship, while indisputably the most durable solution for a refugee from the host 
State, can only be granted by the host State.30 It ends refugee status and allows refugees 
to be part of a national community. From a legal point of view, citizenship for the 
refugee not only represents the right to full legal and diplomatic protection from the 
State (both within and outside the country), but  also indicates a commitment to the 
State on the part of the refugee.31  
 
Whilst the UN Refugee Convention does not enshrine an absolute right of 
naturalisation and, in fact, the enjoyment of most of its provisions is conditional on the 
immigration status of the refugee, the notion of becoming a permanent citizen is not 
 
25 See Hathaway (2005) at 977-978. 
26 See Hathaway (2005) at 977-978. 
27 See UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (2011). 
28 UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation International Protection Handbook  (1996). 
29 UNHCR  “Local integration” available at  https://www.unhcr.org/local-integration-49c3646c101.html 
(accessed 21 June 2019). 
30 Huddleston T & Vink M P “Membership and/or rights? Analysing naturalisation and integration policies 
for immigrants in Europe" (2013) RSCAS PP 2013/15 at 1-2 available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/28121/RSCAS_PP_2013_15rev.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowe
dy  (accessed 22 October 2016). 
31 UNHCR “Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations” (June 
2006) available at 83 at https://www.refworld.org/docid/44bb9b684.html  (accessed 21 June 2019). 
 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 74  
 
alien to it.32 The notion of permanence for refugees was postulated by Grahl-Madsen 
when he examined the plight of refugees without a country of origin, that is, Stateless 
refugees.33 He maintained that when the State is unable to remove  refugees they gain 
freedom of movement and residence; they must be considered to be “lawfully staying” 
in the territory, such that  “after a number of years (normally about three years) [their] 
interest in growing roots must override any other considerations”.34 In short, a refugee 
who has stayed uninterruptedly in the host State for a considerable period of time 
acquires a legitimate expectation to be treated fairly, including when applying for 
naturalisation, which is consistent with Article 34.35   
 
 
4.1 State’s obligations in relation to naturalisation  
 
Article 34 of the UN Refugee Convention provides that States “shall as far as possible 
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees”.36 The use of the word “shall” 
in legislation usually suggests that a duty is imposed 37 ; however, in this case, this duty 
is qualified by the words “as far as possible”. The State can therefore decide whether it 
is dedicated to naturalising any individual or any number of refugees.38 The decision by 
the State must, however, be guided by the well-known principle of good faith.39 States 
cannot simply ignore a provision in an international legal instrument that they have 
ratified.40 A State that refuses to assimilate or naturalise a refugee without 
demonstrating its inability to do so, or refuses simply because it is unwilling,  would be 
in  violation of the UN Refugee Convention.41 Furthermore, once the State has made the 
decision to allow for the naturalisation of refugees, it must abide by the other 
requirements of Article 34, namely, to “expedite” naturalisation proceedings and to 
 
32See Hathaway (2005) at 171-190. 
33 Grahl-Madsen A  A commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 articles 2-11, 13-37 (Geneva : Division 
of International Protection of the UNHCR 1997). 
34 Grahl-Madsen A The status of refugees in international law vol II (Leyden : A W Sijthoff 1972) at 437. 
35 Art 34 of  UN Refugee Convention. 
36 Art 34 of  UN Refugee Convention. 
37 Botha C Statutory interpretation: an introduction for students 3rd ed (Cape Town: Juta 1997) at 67. 
“Shall” is deemed to be mandatory. 
38 See Huddleston & Vink (2013). 
39 The concept of “good faith” is an abstract notion. Justice Stewart famously noted that “I shall not today 
jhattempt to define [it]...But I know it when I see it”. Whilst good faith has no clear definition, the term has 
been widely accepted as one of the main sources of international law. It is incumbent on States Parties, at 
the very least, to provide a good faith justification for excluding refugees from naturalisation. 
See Reinhold S "Good faith in international law” (2013)2 UCLJLJ  40 and  Weis P “Commentary of the 1951 
UN Refugee Convention Travaux Preparatoires” (1995) available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/protection/travaux/4ca34be29/refugee-convention-1951-travaux-
preparatoires-analysed-commentary-dr-paul.html at 989 (accessed 21 June 2019). 
40 See The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v United States of America) (Award) [1910] XI 
RIAA 169 at para 188. 
41 However, the UN Refugee Convention does not establish an inter-State supervisory body to hold States 
accountable  if and when they fail to meet their internationally defined protection obligations. See 
Hathaway J et al “Introduction” (2013) 26 Journal of Refugee Studies 323. 
ART 34 OF THE UN REFUGEE CONVENTION 
 
Page | 75  
 
“reduce the cost” of naturalisation. Unlike the duty to provide for naturalisation, the 
duties to expedite and reduce the costs of naturalisation are framed without 
qualification. These unqualified duties are especially necessary because refugees 
generally struggle to access their rights due to their vulnerable status42. In many 
countries, naturalisation procedures are expensive and involve long waiting periods, 
which is contrary to what Article 34 expects of States. The UNHCR has explained the 
duty to facilitate naturalisation as follows: 
“To ‘facilitate’ naturalization means that refugees and stateless persons should be 
given appropriate facilities for the acquisition of the nationality of the country of 
asylum and should be provided with the necessary information on the regulations 
and procedures in force. Furthermore, it implies that national authorities should 
adopt legal or administrative procedures for the benefit of refugees by which they 
are enabled to qualify for naturalization earlier than aliens generally, they are not 
required to give evidence of loss of their former nationality and that the fees 
normally paid for naturalization proceedings are reduced or waived.”43 
 
As stated above, the UN Refugee Convention gives direction on the costs and speed 
of processing the application for naturalisation, but it does not recommend a time 
period that a refugee must spend in the host State before he or she becomes eligible for 
naturalisation. This issue was raised by the drafters, but no consensus was reached, and 
it was therefore left to individual States to decide. The Canadian representative 
recommended that the period from initial displacement before formal refugee status is 
granted must be taken into account,44 and that the refugee’s stay in the host country 
must be uninterrupted before he or she can be eligible for naturalisation.45 The Italian 
government objected to the naturalisation of refugees who have just entered a country, 
arguing that such action might “embitter the internal situation” or cause “the gravest 
concern to over-population and unemployment”.46  The French representative 
submitted that the duty to “expedite the proceedings” should not apply to the period of 
residency prior to an application for naturalisation.47  In the end, the draft committee 
agreed not to include a specific time period within which to obligate States to allow for 
naturalisation.48 Article 34 thus recommends naturalisation without giving an 
indication of the length of sojourn in the host State for a refugee to become eligible to 
make such an application.  
 
 
42 Union of Refugee Women v Director, Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 (4) SA 395 (CC) 
at para 22. 
43 UNHCR “Positive Steps Forward in the Field of Citizenship” (2006) BiH press release available at 
http://www.unhcr.ba/press/2006pr/030806.htm (accessed 22 October 2016). 
44 UNHCR “The Refugee Convention, 1951: The travaux préparatoires analysed with commentary by Dr. 
Paul Weis” (1990) at 247 available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/53e1dd114.html .  
45 See UNHCR (1990). 
46 See UNHCR (1990) at 247. See also Grahl-Madsen (1997). 
47 See UNHCR  (1990) at 247. 
48 See UNHCR (1990) at 250. 
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A possible way for individual States to address this issue is to apply the principle 
of non-discrimination that exists in international human rights law49 and is also 
available in the national laws of most countries.50 As stated above, according to the 
immigration laws of many States, foreigners become eligible for permanent residence or 
naturalisation after a period of uninterrupted stay in the host State. Refugees need to be 
given different consideration to ordinary immigrants because of their particular 
vulnerabilities, and a large number of countries have reduced the time period for 
refugees to become eligible to apply for naturalisation.51 The length of time a person 
remains a refugee in the host State if there is no other possibility of ending refugee 
status is increasingly coming under scrutiny because of the large number of protracted 
refugee situations in the world today and the obvious prejudices suffered by refugees as 
a result of their protracted refugee status.52  
 
Notwithstanding that the duty to facilitate naturalisation is qualified by the phrase 
“as far as possible”, Article 34 is binding on States. Article 34 is clearly breached where a 
State Party does not allow refugees to secure their citizenship and refuses to provide an 
explanation for that inaccessibility. The article will now direct its attention to South 
Africa and see whether South Africa has adopted policies and practices of naturalisation 
that benefit refugees.  
 
5 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REFUGEES ACT 
South Africa enacted the Refugees Act53 in 1998, and substantively it is compatible with 
international refugee and human rights law. Among other things, the Refugees Act sets 
out structures and mechanisms for administering status determination. These 
structures include Refugee Reception Offices,54 which are staffed by reception officers55 
 
49 Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 : “All are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law." See also Art 26 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. 
50 UNHCR  “The Rule of Law, Equality and Non-discrimination” available at 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/human-rights/equality-and-non-discrimination/ 
(accessed 20 June 2019). 
51 In 1969, the Council of Europe recommended to all Members that refugees be subject to a minimum 
period of residence that does not exceed five years. In current German law, the residency requirement for 
refugees may be reduced from the normal 8-year period to 6 years. UNHR (1990) (per Weis) notes that at 
the time Denmark reduced the requirement from seven to six years in the case of refugees,  Belgium from 
six to three years, and  the Netherlands from five to four years. He also writes that some States reduce 
other hurdles to naturalisation, such as exempting refugees from the requirement to renounce dual-
nationality, as in Switzerland and Finland. In Denmark, the language and integration requirements are 
relaxed for refugees. To cite other examples, in both Kenya and Rwanda, naturalised citizenship can be 
acquired after only five years of residence. 
52 These prejudices include poorer access to employment, education and housing and can be exacerbated 
in States that use encampment policies for refugees as they limit freedom of movement. See Loescher & 
Milner (2005). 
53 Act 130 of 1998. 
54 Refugees Act at s 8. 
55 Refugees Act at s 8(2). 
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and status determinations officers,56 as well as two oversight bodies. The SCRA57 and 
the Refugee Appeal Board (RAB)58 consider reviews and hear appeals, respectively. In 
addition, the SCRA has an oversight role and must administer the certification process 
which is the first step in the naturalisation process. The SCRA is thus the most 
important decision-maker with regard to accessing naturalisation for the refugee. 
 
The Refugees Act also offers a generous range of rights and entitlements to 
refugees.  It defines the refugee in terms similar to those of the UN Refugee Convention 
as well as the Organisation of African Unity Refugee Convention (OAU Refugee 
Convention).59 It expressly states that all rights in the Bill of Rights of the South African 
Constitution apply to refugees.60  
      
Like the UN Refugee Convention, the Refugees Act has provisions on cessation of 
refugee status61, and recognises the principle of non-refoulement.62 Significantly, the 
Refugees Act provides for possibilities for ending refugee status after a period of 
continuous stay.63   
       
The major shift in refugee law and policy from Apartheid to democracy can be 
summarised as follows: South Africa has moved away from the ad hoc approach during 
Apartheid, which denied a human rights approach and advocated discriminatory laws 
based on skin colour 64 and excluded black refugees. The previous policy used the 
doctrine of sovereignty to regard citizenship as a prerogative of the State, such that the 
State would choose (without censure) to whom it granted refugee status and 
citizenship. Presently, the State’s actions have to be counterbalanced by the country’s 
commitment to human rights as espoused in the South African Constitution.     
 
56 Refugees Act at s 8(2). 
57 Refugees Act at s 9(1). 
58 Refugees Act at s 12(1). 
59 See s 3 of the Refugees Act, which states: “Subject to Chapter 3, a person qualifies for refugee status for 
the purposes of this Act if that person (a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of 
his or her race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is 
outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of that country, or, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former 
habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it; or (b) owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in 
either a part or the whole of his or her country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his or her 
place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge elsewhere; or (c) is a dependent of a person 
contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b).”  
60  Section 27 states : “A refugee… (b) enjoys full legal protection, which includes the rights set out in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution and the right to remain in the Republic in accordance with the provisions of 
this Act.” 
61 See s 5 of the Refugees Act, which provides for the “cessation of refugee status”. 
62 See s 2 of the Refugees Act, which provides for the “general prohibition of refusal of entry, expulsion, 
extradition or return to other country in certain circumstances”. 
63 See s 27(c) of  Refugees Act. 
64 Crush J “Introduction: immigration, human rights & the Constitution” in Crush J (ed) Beyond control: 
immigration & human rights in a democratic South Africa (Cape Town: South African Migration Project 
1998) at 2. 
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6 IDENTIFYING AND ANALYSING THE STEPS IN THE NATURALISATION              
PROCESS IN TERMS OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
South Africa has not filed any reservations to the UN Refugee Convention and provides 
for the naturalisation of refugees. However, the pathway is bound by complicated 
processes regulated by three different pieces of legislation. First, refugees are required 
to seek permission to apply for permanent residence in terms of the Refugees Act,65 a 
process called “certification”.66 Thereafter, refugees may apply for permanent residence 
in terms of the Immigration Act.67 Finally, refugees may apply for naturalisation in 
terms of the Citizenship Act.68 Each step is activated by an application and requires the 
previous step to be satisfactorily completed. Since each step is governed by a different 
institution the system can be difficult to navigate and is not as linear as it seems. 
Hathaway calls for a simpler system that is well-resourced and accountable, and which 
could take the form of a specialized body that is responsible for the entire process of 
refugee applications.69 Nevertheless, the law as it stands requires refugees to 
manoeuvre through a prohibitively complicated process that makes naturalisation a 
difficult feat. Moreover, the difficulties faced by refugees throughout the asylum process 
make it harder for them to reach the final stage of the Refugees Act or the certification 
process. Such problems include: accessing the asylum system,70 the length of time it 
takes to process the claims, and the extended appeals process.71 A lack of consistent 
good faith is also evident by assessing some of the actions taken against the SCRA.72 The 
process of certification and the entitlement to apply for permanent residence are found 
in section 27 of the Refugees Act. This section also confirms the rights that refugees 
have and is pivotal to the refugees’ full integration in South Africa. Section 27(c) states: 
“A refugee is entitled to apply for an immigration permit in terms of the Aliens 
Control Act, 199173 after five years’ continuous residence in the Republic from the 
 
65 See s 27 of the Refugees Act. 
66 Refugees must prove to the SCRA that they will remain refugees indefinitely.  
67 Act 13 of 2002. 
68 Act 88 of 1995. 
69 Hathaway J “Refugee law challenges: a conversation with James Hathaway” presentation delivered at 
the University of Cape Town (2019); Hathaway J C “The global cop-out on refugees” (2018) 30 
International Journal of Refugee Law 591. 
70 Amit R No way in: barriers to access, service and administrative justice at South Africa’s refugee reception 
offices ACMS Research Report (2012) at 47. 
71 Amit R Queue here for corruption: measuring irregularities in South Africa’s asylum system. Report by 
Lawyers for Human Rights and The African Centre for Migration and Society (2015). 
72 See: The Somali Association of South Africa and others v The Chairperson of the Standing 
Committee for Refugee Affairs (WCHC)  case no 18655/14 (case withdrawn), Akanakimana v 
Chairperson of the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs and others (2015) ZAWCHC 17, 
Katsshingu v The Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs and others (WCHC) unreported case no 
19726/2010 (2 November 2011). 
73 The Aliens Control Act was replaced by the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. 
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date on which he or she was granted asylum, if the Standing Committee certifies 
that he or she will remain a refugee indefinitely.”74  
 
The positive feature of this provision is that it provides for a legal pathway to 
ending refugee status. First, a refugee must make an application to the SCRA, which is an 
independent body created by the Refugees Act, certifying that he or she will remain a 
refugee indefinitely.75  However, after gaining certification, refugees are asked to step 
outside of the Refugees Act, which is protection oriented, and make an application in 
terms of the Immigration Act, (since the Aliens Control Act has been repealed) which is 
generally control oriented. Thereafter refugees with permanent residence must 
navigate the Citizenship Act which favours assimilation and does not provide any 
safeguards for refugees. It is clear from a reading of the preamble that the Refugees Act 
seeks to provide benefits and protections to refugees, whereas the Immigration Act 
aims to control the influx of people. This provides a further reason for a unified system 
and for all refugee matters to be dealt with under the Refugees Act.  Refugees are a 
particularly vulnerable group that should not be assessed under control oriented 
immigration laws.76 
 
7 THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS IN TERMS OF THE REFUGEES ACT 
 
The certification process in terms of the Refugees Act is the first step toward 
naturalisation but it is fraught with obstacles. The only South African case where the 
applicants sought clarification of the approach used by the SCRA to interpret the 
certification process, in terms of the Refugees Act, is The Somali Association of South 
Africa and others v the Chairperson of the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs77 
(Somali Association case). This case is significant because it challenged the SCRA’s 
narrow interpretation of section 27 (c) of the Refugees Act. It furthermore challenged 
the SCRA’s use of the forward-looking test, its failure to apply the audi alteram principle 
in its use of country of origin information, and its incorrect application of the standard 
of proof requirements when refugees are required to speculate about their safety upon 
return to their country of origin. Most importantly, this case challenged the SCRA’s 
literal interpretation of the requirement that refugees must prove that they will remain 
refugees indefinitely, an approach that undermines the lived experiences of refugees 
and their lasting fear of past persecution.  
 
This case deals with Somali refugees who have made applications for 
certification to the SCRA. Due to the intensification of violence in Somalia in 2016, the 
SCRA allowed the applicants to resubmit their applications and thus there was no final 
judgment. Nevertheless, the founding documents of this case reveal the SCRA’s 
approach to certification. According to the founding affidavit, 35 Somali refugees made 
 
74 Section 27 of the Refugees Act. 
75 Section 9 of the Refugees Act. 
76 Hathaway J “Refugee law is not immigration law” (2002) World Refugee Survey 38.  
77 (WCC) unreported case no 18655/14 (case withdrawn). 
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their applications for certification between October 2010 and June 2012. They all 
received feedback in 2014, stating that their applications had been rejected because 
they were unable to prove that they would remain refugees indefinitely. In addition to 
these 35 Somali refugees, a further 132 Somali refugees made an application for  joinder 
as all of them also had their certification applications rejected on exactly the same basis: 
that they were unable to prove that they would remain refugees indefinitely. Both 
groups approached the University of Cape Town Refugee Law Clinic for legal assistance. 
Similar experiences by Somali refugees were noted throughout the country, and the 
applicants submitted  supporting affidavits from  the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University Law Clinic,78 the Legal Resources Centre,79 the Wits Law Clinic, and Lawyers 
for Human Rights.80  
 
The response to the applicants’ case shows that the SCRA has adopted a literal 
approach to the interpretation of the provision that refugees must prove that they will 
remain refugees indefinitely before certification can be granted for purposes of 
permanent residence.81 In its answering affidavit, the SCRA maintains that the literal 
meaning of the word “indefinitely” must be used. In support of its position, it makes 
reference to a rule of statutory interpretation, which states that 
  
“… in the first instance you take what the word means in the popular sense and 
ordinary parlance, words use in an enactment should be understood in their 
everyday meaning unless that word is in conflict with the intention of the law giver 
as it appears from the statute read as a whole and from other material 
circumstance”.82 
The SCRA also used as authority for its approach the case of Vansa Vanadium SA Ltd v 
Registrar of Deeds,83 which interpreted the word “indefinite” as meaning without 
“limitation as to time”. It adopted this meaning without considering the context in which 
the word was used and interpreted in that case. A further authority used by the SCRA is 
Treadwell and another v Roberts,84 where the Court considered the meaning of the 
expression “for an indefinite period” and held that “indefinite” in itself means “not 
defined”. The SCRA also made reference to the dictionary meaning of “indefinitely”. 
Using these sources, it  came to the conclusion that all of the applicants were unable to 
prove that they would remain refugees indefinitely and therefore refused to grant them 
certification, effectively blocking their permanent residence applications.   
 
78 Available at http://cla.nmmu.ac.za. 
79 Available at http://lrc.org.za/lcrarchive/  
80 Available at http://www.lhr.org.za/  
81 Somali Association case , answering affidavit at paras 15-18. 
82 Kellaway E A Principles of legal interpretation of statutes, contracts and wills (Oxford : Butterworths 
1995)  at 69. 
83 (1996) 1 All SA 433 (T).  
84 1913 WLD 54. 
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Since it is impossible for anyone to prove that they will remain a refugee indefinitely, 
the literal approach adopted by the SCRA has had the effect of making permanent 
residence unavailable to refugees.85 Also noteworthy is the fact that the SCRA’s 
interpretation did not consider the term ”foreseeable future” used in the Regulations to 
the Refugees Act86 (Refugee Regulations) which state that the applicant must set out the 
reasons why he or she “will not be able to return to his or her country in the foreseeable 
future”. It also did not consider the application form for certification which asks the 
same of applicants. It is thus unclear whether proving indefinite refugee status means 
proving that the reasons that gave rise to refugee status are likely to subsist indefinitely 
or for the foreseeable future.87  
It is trite law in South Africa that an Act of Parliament is superior to regulations. 
However, regulations that are inconsistent with their parent Act cannot be ignored 
without reasons. In the light of the fact that there are no guidelines for the SCRA to 
make this determination, well-known principles of statutory interpretation should have  
been utilised.  In the absence of specific guidelines, the Refugee Regulations must thus 
be interpreted in a manner that reflects the purpose of the Refugees Act. That is, they 
must be interpreted to ensure the protection – rather than the control – of refugees.88 
The starting point for statutory interpretation is that an administrator must interpret 
the word in its ordinary meaning as long as it does not contradict the clear intention of 
the legislature. Additional presumptions in statutory interpretation caution against 
adopting an interpretation that renders an Act superfluous, futile, or nugatory or an 
interpretation that is “harsh, unjust and unreasonable”.89  
 
To prove that they will remain a refugee indefinitely, a refugee would have to show, 
for example, that the current government will remain in power indefinitely; where the 
civil war has ended, that it will not flare up again; or where there is peace, that the peace 
will not last. All of these claims are difficult,  if not impossible, to prove. Proving the risk 
of harm faced by the refugee – whether from the State or non-State actors – is also 
difficult. These are thus particularly harsh and unreasonable requirements that the 
applicant is expected to meet. These harsh requirements could render certification 
impossible and section 27 of the Act superfluous. To avoid making section 27 of the Act 
meaningless, it must be presumed that the Act was enacted to ensure that the 
certification process was fair, accessible and just and to facilitate access by refugees to a 
 
85 See Botha (1997) for a full discussion of the application of statutory interpretation principles. 
86 Pursuant to  27 (c) of the Act  reg 15 (4)(c) states:  
“ 1. If the Standing Committee determines that the individual will remain a refugee for the 
foreseeable future, the Standing Committee will certify that the individual will remain a refugee 
indefinitely, and the individual may apply for an immigration permit pursuant to section 27(c) of 
the Act.” 
87 It is confirmed that “indefinitely” could be defined as “endlessly, continually, forever, ad infinitum”, 
whereas “foreseeable future” means that part of the future that can be envisioned whilst the current 
circumstances remain intact. Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010). 
88 Department of Home Affairs Draft of Green Paper on International Migration (GN 849  in GG  18033 of 
30 May 1997). 
89 Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd  2010 (5) SA 137 (SCA).  
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suitable immigration permit. The literal interpretation em\ployed by the SCRA  
provides a significant barrier to naturalisation.  
 
Furthermore, from the letters of rejection received by the Somali applicants it is 
apparent that the SCRA came to the conclusion that the applicants would not remain 
refugees indefinitely by looking only at the conditions in the country of origin and not 
the individual refugee claims of the Somali applicants.  The SCRA justified its decision to 
reject the certifications by stating that significant change had occurred in Somalia, 
indicating that the current conflict was reaching an end.90 Arguing that certification was 
inherently a forward-looking process, it said that the current conditions in the country 
of origin had to be taken into account91 and not simply those when the refugees fled 
their country. The SCRA appears to have relied on evidence that supported its view that 
conditions had changed so much in Somalia that it was safe for refugees to return home. 
There is no indication that the SCRA considered the information supplied by the 
applicants that showed that violence in Somalia had continued to occur and  was likely 
to continue into the foreseeable future. The SCRA also only considered information 
about improvements in Somalia at the national level and ignored the specific areas 
whence the refugees had fled .92 Even though the burden of proof in a civil matter is 
generally on the applicant, international refugee law has recognised the prejudice to 
vulnerable refugees and thus advises that this burden should be shared between 
examiner and refugee.93 While decision-makers are allowed to conduct their own 
investigations to assist them in discharging their evidential burden,94 the information 
gathered must be shared with the affected refugees. In administrative law generally, it is 
also the case that when an administrator uses information not considered by the 
applicant, the applicant must be given an opportunity to respond to it.95 These concepts 
were reinforced in AOL v Minister of Home Affairs.96 In that case, the Court considered 
whether the RAB was obliged to bring prejudicial information to the attention of the 
applicant and afford the applicant  an opportunity to deal with the information before it 
made its final  decision. The Court, referring to Kotzé v Minister of Health and another,97  
came to the conclusion that the applicant was denied a fair hearing because “the 
applicant should have been granted the opportunity to deal with the information, which 
did not form part of his application, and which was later taken into account”.98 This 
decision is consistent with section 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
 
90 Answering affidavit at paras 50-59. 
91 Answering affidavit at para 17. 
92 Answering affidavit at paras 50 – 59. 
93 UNHCR Handbook and guidelines on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (December 2011) 
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3  (UNHCR Handbook) available at 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html at para 196. 
94 UNHCR Handbook at para 196.  
95 Kotzé v Minister of Health and another 1996 (3) BCLR 417 (T).   
96 AOL v Minister of Home Affairs and others 2006 (2) SA 8 (D). 
97 See Kotzé v Minister of Health and another 1996(3) BCLR 417 (T). 
98 See AOL v Minister of Home Affairs and others 2006(2) SA 8 (D) at para 14. 
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(PAJA),99 which provides that any person adversely affected by administrative action 
has the right to know what evidence is being relied upon to reach a decision against him 
or her.100  
 
In spite of this decision, it is evident from the Somali Association case that the SCRA 
used reports on countries’ conditions without giving the applicants an opportunity to 
respond. However, under both administrative and refugee law in South Africa, 
information must be shared with an applicant for refugee status, who must be given an 
opportunity to respond to such information or adduce his or her own information to 
contradict it. Only the launching of the Somali Association case to challenge this practice 
led to the SCRA backtracking on conditions in Somalia and inviting applicants to 
resubmit their certification applications. 
 
Furthermore, the SCRA’s forward-looking assessment of the risk  requires 
conjecturing about the future. The UNHCR,101 refugee law scholars102 and the courts103 
have commented on both of these issues (discussed below), that is, lasting and durable 
change and the application of a forward-looking test. 
 
The UNHCR’s publications on cessation can be extrapolated to provide guidance on 
durable and lasting change.104 As outlined in the UNHCR’s “The cessation clauses” 
report (UNHCR Guidelines 1999), the ceased circumstances, or cessation, clause  is only 
invoked if peace in the country of origin is durable and lasting, for which there are three 
requirements.105 The first is that there must be lasting peace. The second is that the 
peace must be enduring. The third is that peace must result in the eradication of a well-
founded fear of persecution as well as the restoration of the refugees’ protection by his 
or her country of origin.106 Ultimately, a fundamental change in the country of origin, 
which refers  complete political change, has to occur, and it must be of such a “profound 
and enduring nature that refugees from that country no longer require protection from 
a foreign country”.107  The home government must be able to demonstrate that it can 
take care of its citizens and that it can guarantee their safety.   
 
Depending on the grounds for flight, significant reforms, such as, elections, 
declarations of amnesties, and the repeal of oppressive laws, may serve as evidence of a 
 
99 Act 3 of 2000. 
100 Section 6 of PAJA. 
101 Khan F & Schreier T Refugee law in South Africa  (Cape Town: Juta 2014) at 41. 
102 Goo\dwin-Gill G & McAdam J The refugee in international law 3rd ed ( Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2007).\ 
103 INS v Cordoza-Fonseca 480 US 421 (1987) 453; Van Garderen NO v Refugee Appeal Board (TPD) 
unreported case no 30720/2006 (19 June 2007); Fang v Refugee Appeal Board 2007 (2) SA 447 (T). 
104 Article 1C of the UN Refugee Convention. 
105 UNHCR “The cessation clauses: guidelines on their application” (1999) available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c06138c4.html  (accessed 2 February 2013) at paras 10-16.  
106 See UNHCR Guidelines (1999). 
107 See UNHCR Guidelines (1999). 
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fundamental change.108 Most importantly, the home government must be able to 
demonstrate that it can take care of its citizens and that it can guarantee their safety. 
Evidence of movement in a peaceful or rights-based direction is insufficient: the basic 
reforms must be in place.109 Not all political reforms warrant cessation — they must be 
causally connected to the risk upon which refugee status was recognised.110 
 
It is also important that the fundamental change is tested against the individual 
applicant’s personal circumstances. The Court in Mayonga v Refugee Appeal Board found 
that even though the war was officially over in Angola it had a duty to assess the impact 
of those changes on Mr Mayonga.111 The Court made it clear that the decision-maker 
must not be content to simply note that changes have taken place but must assess the 
impact of those changes on the person concerned.  Additionally, Hathaway asserts that 
“formal evidence of change” must be tested against the reality on the ground.112 The 
durability of the reform must be tested, and the period over which the reform is tested 
will inevitably be longer where the country has just emerged from conflict.  
 
Furthermore, the supposed reform must also be linked to the core concern of the 
refugee. For instance, an individual who identifies as part of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, or Intersex community (LGBTI) and who fled a war-torn country, would 
not necessarily cease to be a refugee when the war is over and a stable government is 
established, if their sexual or gender identity remains a target of persecution. The 
question for that refugee will be whether conditions for persecution based on their 
LGBTI status remain. Ultimately, the question that results is: can refugees avail 
themselves of the protection of their home State – where the protection provided is 
effective, viable and has regard to the general human rights situation of the country? 
 
South Africa employs a forward-looking test in its determination of refugee status – 
the putative refugee is expected to satisfy the administrator that they will face 
persecution should they be returned to their country of origin. Their past persecution 
may be a factor in the determination of their refugee status, but they will not be granted 
refugee status if they cannot provide evidence of continued fear of persecution. Many 
countries, including the United States of America and Canada, do not rely on the 
forward-looking test when refugees apply for refugee status, but simply consider the 
situation at the time of application. The forward-looki\ng test is not considered 
 
108 See UNHCR Guidelines (1999). 
109 See UK House of Lords Hoxha judgement : R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte 
Hoxha, [2002] EWCA Civ (CA 2002); see also Nkosi v Canada (1993) FCJ 629 (Can FC, Jun 23 1993),  
“declining to refuse refugee status on the basis of a hesitant and equivocal finding that certain limited 
changes in circumstances in Zaïre occurred”. Hathaway  (2005) at 923. 
110 See paras 23 and 24 of “Ceased Circumstances Clause” of UNHCR Guidelines (1999). Fundamental 
changes are considered effective only if they remove the basis of the fear of persecution; therefore, such 
changes must be assessed in the light of the particular cause of the fear, so as to ensure that  the situation 
which warranted the grant of refugee status has ceased to exist. 
111 Mayongo v Refugee Appeal Board (2007) JOL19645 (T) at para 9. 
112 See Hathaway (2005) at 925. 
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realistic, and the discretion afforded to administrators is considered to be too wide to 
ensure fairness and justice.113  
 
Even though South Africa has provided in its Refugees Act for refugee status on the 
basis of past persecution 114, the forward-looking test is generally employed for refugee 
status determination.115 This forward-looking test is also required at the certification 
stage when refugees are expected to speculate whether they will remain refugees 
indefinitely. Expecting the refugee to prove that he or she will remain a refugee 
indefinitely requires speculating about the future. The manner in which refugee law has 
dealt with the speculative test in status determination is by reconsidering the accepted 
standard of proof of a “balance of probabilities” that is generally used in ordinary civil 
proceedings.116 As a result the standard of proof for establishing refugee status has been 
set lower than on a balance of probabilities. It is internationally accepted that the 
standard of proof is  reasonable possibility.117 
 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam have argued that  
“… a decision on the well-foundedness of the fear is essentially an essay in 
hypothesis, an attempt to prophesy what might happen to the applicant in the 
near future, if he returned to his country of origin. Particular care, therefore, needs 
to be exercised in applying the correct standard of proof ”.118  
 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam further explain that in civil cases the typical issue is 
whether a legally close, relevant relation exists between past causes and past effects. 
“An applicant for refugee status is adducing a future speculative risk as the basis for a 
claim to protection”119  – a degree of lesser likelihood than that of a balance of 
probabilities is required.  
 
 
113 See US Immigration Regulations, 8 CFR. § 208.13(b)(l)(iii)(a)(2005); Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act, chap 27, SC 2001, § 108(4) (Can.). 
114 Section 5(2) of the Refugees Act. 
115 Van Garderen NO v Refugee Appeal Board (TPD) unreported case no 30720/2006 (19 June 2007) ; Fang 
v Refugee Appeal Board and others 2007 (2) SA 447 (T). 
116 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007); See also UNHCR “Note on standard and burden of proof in refugee 
claims” (16 December 1998) available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3338.html , (accessed 5 
May 2016). The United States Supreme Court in INS v Cordoza-Fonseca 480 US 421 (1987) 453; Van 
Garderen NO v Refugee Appeal Board unreported case no 30720/2006( 19 June 2007) ;  and Fang v 
Refugee Appeal Board 2007 (2) SA 447 (T)) rejected the traditional balance of probabilities standard in 
favour of a more generous reasonable possibility test. The US Supreme Court held : “There is simply no 
room in the United States definition for concluding that because an applicant has a ten percent (10%) 
chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no well-founded fear” of the 
event happening … [A ] moderate interpretation of the well-founded fear standard would indicate that so 
long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will 
probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.” (Gibney M “A 
‘well-founded fear’ of persecution” (1998) 10(1) Human Rights Quarterly 109 at 110 ). 
117 UNHCR Note (1998). 
118 See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007) at 54. 
119 See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007) at 54-55. 
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South Africa has only applied the lesser standard of proof when determining 
whether a person is a refugee.120 Upon application for certification  a refugee is 
expected to establish whether he or she will remain a refugee indefinitely; he or she is 
similarly demanded to speculate about the future, not about the foreseeable future as 
specified by the SCRA on the certification form. There is currently no set standard of 
proof at the certification stage. The author accordingly submits that South Africa should 
also apply the lesser standard of proof when considering certification applications. 
 
From the above discussion it is apparent that a harsh or literal interpretation of 
the legislative provision that entitles a refugee to apply for a durable immigration 
permit can effectively block the refugee’s path thereto, which inevitably results in 
perpetual refugee status if return to the country of origin is not possible.  
 
8. FROM REFUGEE STATUS TO IMMIGRATION STATUS: EVALUATING 
PERMANENT RESIDENCE AS A DURABLE SOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Living with refugee status in South Africa is an insecure way of life. This insecurity 
stems largely from the type of short-term documentation issued to refugees  (two years 
for the section 24 permit), and the fact that far too many services are withheld from 
refugees due to their status. Accordingly, refugees struggle to enjoy the rights 
guaranteed to them by the South African Constitution and the Refugees Act. They may 
work and study, but cannot be registered in respect of the legal, medical, and 
educational professions.121 They also struggle to open bank accounts, access pension 
funds, obtain home loans, acquire a driver’s licence, and find jobs.122 Given this lack of 
access to rights and protection, permanent residence undoubtedly provides a more 
secure legal status. In South Africa, permanent residence is made available to refugees 
through the Immigration Act,123 but as explained above, the applicant must meet the 
prescribed requirements of the Refugees Act before the completion of an application in 
terms of the Immigration Act. 
 
Permanent residence is not mentioned in the UN Refugee Convention, but it 
allows refugees a secure legal status. Refugees may want to retain their nationality for 
various reasons, but this does not mean that they do not want to be part of a world 
community. Permanent residence can give refugees a sense of belonging. For refugees 
who do not want to change their nationality, permanent residence is a good middle 
ground solution. 
 
120 See Van Garderen NO v Refugee Appeal Board (TPD)unreported case no 30720/2006 (19 June 2007);                                                                                                                    
Fang v Refugee Appeal Board and others 2007(4)SA 447(T). 
121 Bhamjee A & Klaaren J “Legal problems facing refugees in Johannesburg’ in Loren B Landau (ed) 
Forced migrants in the new Johannesburg: towards a local government response (Johannesburg: Forced 
Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand 2004) at 54–60. 
122 See Bhamjee & Klaaren (2004) at 54–60. 
123 Act 13 of 2002. 
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The courts, too, have identified permanent residents as a class of foreigners with 
more rights than refugees.124 Furthermore, in contrast to local integration, which in 
reality can mean indefinite refugee status, permanent residence could signify an end to 
refugee status and should be considered as a durable solution.  
        
Permanent residency refers to a person’s visa status and means that a person is 
allowed to reside indefinitely within a country of which he or she is not a citizen. Most 
importantly, permanent residence allows a foreigner to reside permanently in a host 
country without giving up his or her nationality. This secure legal status allows for 
greater integration into the host community than local integration. According to section 
25(1) of the Immigration Act, a holder of a permanent residence permit “has all the 
rights, privileges, duties and obligations of a citizen save for those rights, privileges, 
duties and obligations which a law or the Constitution explicitly ascribes to 
citizenship”.125 
 
Permanent residence is distinct from citizenship, but it is also distinct from 
refugee status. This difference is evident in South Africa, because permanent residence 
is a legal residency status that a refugee can apply for only five years after being granted 
refugee status.126  
 
In South Africa , a refugee can  apply for permanent residence in terms of section 
27 of the Immigration Act. Section 27(d) provides :” The director-general may issue a 
permanent residence permit to a foreigner of good and sound character who is a 
refugee referred to in section 27(c) of the Refugees Act subject to any prescribed 
requirements.” However, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) is not required to 
inform refugees of the availability of permanent residence as an option to end their 
refugee status. Refugees may thus be unaware of this right and continue to live with 
refugee status in perpetuity in South Africa. 
According to regulation 24(11) of the Immigration Regulations,127 the requirements 
contemplated in section 27(d) of the Immigration Act are: 
 
“(a) the submission of the certification contemplated in section 27(c) of the 
Refugees Act, 1998 (Act No. 130 of 1998); 
(b) where applicable, the submission of affidavits with regard to aliases used by 
the applicant and family members; and 
(c) the submission of the documentation contemplated in regulation 22(3)(b), (f), 
(g), (h) and (i): Provided that in the case of documents issued by the country from 
which he or she fled not being available, a sworn affidavit shall be submitted.”128 
 
124 Khosa & others v Minister of Social Development and others 2004 (6) SA 505. 
125 Section 25(1) of the Immigration Act. 
126 Refer to the explanation of s 27 of the Immigration Act below. 
127 DHA Immigration Regulations 2014 (GNR 413 of 22 May 2014 in GG 37679). 
128 Regulation 24(11) of the Immigration Regulations. 
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All refugee applicants for permanent residence must therefore satisfy the DHA 
that they have been granted certification by the SCRA on the basis that they will remain 
refugees indefinitely and that they have been continuously present in South Africa for a 
period of five years after being granted refugee status. In addition, the applicants must 
submit their own birth certificates and those of their dependents, proof of spousal 
relationships, medical and radiological reports, and police clearance certificates.  
 
It may not always be possible for refugees to provide all of these documents 
because of the manner in which they are forced to flee and because their refugee status 
makes it difficult for them to approach their governments for such documents. 
Understandably, the Regulations require an affidavit in place of the prescribed 
documents where the documents cannot be obtained.  
 
Generally, permanent residence applicants have to demonstrate that they are of 
good character, and a police clearance certificate issued by their own government is 
taken as evidence of this. The certificate normally attests that the bearer has not been 
convicted of any criminal offence or engaged in any undesirable behaviour.  The 
Regulations make an exception  for a refugee who cannot be expected to approach their 
government for such a reference of good character. Refugees must instead source such 
confirmation of good character from the South African police, who will only issue such  
certificate if there is no criminal record in South Africa.129  
 
While this exception is welcome, it has been found to be particularly prejudicial to 
refugees who are charged with a crime if their permits expire and are forced to admit 
guilt and pay administrative fines.130 Permits expire most often because  refugees are 
unable to access the Refugee Reception Offices due to maladministration at these offices 
or due to lack of funds to travel to offices located far away from their places of 
residence.131 These technical difficulties in accessing the Refugee Reception Offices have 
criminalised refugees and compromised their good character, and thus their ability to 
receive permanent residence even after  they have successfully received certification 
from the SCRA. 
 
Another major obstacle is the processing time for a permanent residence 
application, which currently is at least two years. This problem is not unique to 
 
129 See South African Police Service “Police clearance certificates: Applying for a police clearance 
certificate (PCC)” available at https://www.saps.gov.za/services/applying_clearence_certificate.php  
(accessed 17 February 2017). 
130 Bukasa v Minister of Home Affairs (WCC) unreported case no 22197/10. 
131  Abdulaahi and others v The Director General of Home Affairs and others (WCC) unreported case no 
7705/2013. 
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refugees who apply for permanent residence: it applies to all permanent resident 
applicants.132  
 
In Eisenberg and others v Director-General Home Affairs and others, the Western 
Cape High Court held that waiting for 19 months for a visa and permit to be finalised is 
unlawful, unjust and procedurally unfair. Applicants have a right to have their 
applications finalised speedily. For refugees the delay is particularly prejudicial because 
they have already waited more than five years to receive certification from the SCRA 
before applying for permanent residence.  
 
Yet another obstacle is monetary. Even though refugees have been exempted from 
paying the fees for the application, they still have to pay the private company, VFS 
Global, which processes all immigration visa applications (apart from asylum 
applications) made within South Africa. There is an enormous administrative fee of 
R1350 for handling the application.133  
 
South Africa has only considered the particular position of refugees to a certain 
extent. This has been done by lowering the requirements for their applications for 
permanent residency, by reducing their application fees, and by allowing them to obtain 
a police clearance in South Africa, as opposed to their countries of origin. However, 
there are still many obstacles. It is clear from the extended waiting periods and remote 
Refugee Reception Offices that South Africa has not sufficiently considered the 
vulnerabilities of refugees in legislating permanent residency requirements. 
 
While it appears that South Africa has adhered to Article 34 of the UN Refugee 
Convention by making it easier for refugees to apply for residency through the two 
exceptions, in fact South Africa has made the process more cumbersome by expecting 
refugees to fulfil additional requirements that other foreigners do not have to . For 
example, a refugee, unlike other foreigners, has to undergo the burdensome 
certification process. Furthermore, while other foreigners can easily apply for 
permanent residence on the basis of their permanent employment and other visa status  
in South Africa, this option only became available to refugees and asylum seekers after a 
Constitutional Court ruling in October 2018.134 However, because refugee documents 
are only valid for a period of two years,  refugees struggle to  find permanent 
employment that would enable them to apply for permanent residence.  
          
 It is recommended that, similarly to  permanent residence, applicants’ 
information about their personal circumstances in South Africa, such as, their 
contribution or loyalty to South Africa or their self-sufficient status, should be 
considered. Overall, the system does not favour the application by refugees for 
 
132 Eisenberg and others v Director-General Home Affairs and others 2012 (3) SA 508 (WCC). 
133 VFS Global “Visa fees at a glance” available at https://www.vfsglobal.com/dha/southafrica/visa-fees-
at-glance.html  (accessed 8 September 2016). 
134 Ahmed and others v Minister of Home Affairs and another (2018) (12) BCLR 1451 (CC).  
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permanent residence. Refugees must first overcome the hurdle of proving that they will 
remain a refugee indefinitely, and once they have overcome that hurdle, they have to 
fulfil the eligibility and procedural requirements of permanent residency. While 
permanent residency has been granted to a significant number of refugees, this does not 
negate that the process is cumbersome and not easily available to all. 135  
9 FROM PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN TERMS OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT TO 
NATURALISATION VIA THE CITIZENSHIP ACT   
Once a refugee has been afforded permanent residence in South Africa, they can apply 
for naturalisation. The application for naturalisation can be made only after five years of 
continuous residence as a permanent resident.136 This means that a refugee who 
obtains permanent residence and lives in South Africa continuously for  at least five 
years can apply for naturalisation. There is thus a legal pathway to naturalisation for 
refugees in South Africa by means of the immigration and citizenship laws. Although 
these provisions give expression to Article 34 of the UN Refugee Convention, many 
challenges make it difficult for refugees to obtain naturalisation.  
 
Refugees may acquire citizenship in South Africa, but only upon submission and 
acceptance of an application. Furthermore, consideration of the application is 
discretionary as the responsible Minister may reject it if he or she feels that the 
applicant is not of good moral character, does not speak any official South African 
language well enough, or for other reasons.137 South African citizenship policy thus 
appears to be assimilationist in nature.  
Section 5(a) of the Citizenship Amendment Act138 provides : 
“The Minister may, upon application in the prescribed manner, grant a certificate 
of naturalization as a South Africa citizen to any foreigner who satisfies the 
Minister that: 
 
(b) he or she has been admitted to the Republic for permanent residence 
therein; and 
(c) he or she is ordinarily resident in the Republic and that he or she has been 
so resident for a continuous period of not less than five years immediately 
preceding the date of his or her application.”139  
 
According to these  provisions  a refugee is eligible for naturalisation in South 
Africa if he or she has been physically and continuously present in South Africa for no 
less than 10 years. This means that the minimum period of qualification for 
 
135 DHA “White Paper on international migration for South Africa” ( GN 750 in GG 41009 of 28 July 2017 ) 
at 46.  
136 Section 5 of Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. 
137 Sections 5(1)(d)-(g) of Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. 
138 South African Citizenship Amendment Act 17 of 2010. 
139 Section 5(b) of South African Citizenship Amendment Act 17 of 2010. 
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naturalisation is more than double the period stipulated by the UNHCR for refugees in 
protracted refugee situations. 140 
 
South Africa makes no distinction between refugees and other foreigners as far as 
the application for naturalisation is concerned, although the UN Refugee Convention 
expects it to do so.141 The European case study serves as a good example of Article 34 
implemented in good faith. South Africa should consider these good faith practices. 
Specifically, the Council of Europe Explanatory Report142 contains some examples of 
favourable conditions for refugees applying for naturalisation, and which include a 
shorter period of required residence, less stringent language requirements, a simpler 
procedure, and the lowering of fees. Some European Union States have translated the 
spirit of these provisions into their national laws by reducing waiting periods and fees 
or removing the requirements for the renunciation of the citizenship of the host 
country. A further good practice among European States is that the period spent as an 
asylum seeker is taken into consideration when calculating the waiting period required 
for refugees to apply for citizenship.  In contrast, section 5 of the Citizenship Act 
suggests that the period between entry into South Africa and obtaining refugee status is 
not considered. This is inconsistent with the duty that South Africa has in international 
law to assist refugees to meet the requirements for naturalisation. 
 
No immigrant can hold more than one legal status in South Africa, and refugees 
must give up their refugee status when they gain permanent residence or 
naturalisation.143 However, by the time refugees apply for naturalisation, they are no 
longer considered to be refugees but permanent residents. Accordingly, refugees have a 
choice, as they are not compelled to apply for naturalisation once they acquire 
permanent residence. It is therefore important to ask whether refugees who have been 
granted permanent residence need or want the additional guarantee of naturalisation 
because adopting South African citizenship could very well mean that they will lose the 
citizenship of their own countries 
 
It cannot be disputed that permanent residence ends refugee status and hence can 
be used to avert protracted refugee situations. However, there is a strong possibility 
that those with permanent residence may become stateless.  Refugees in protracted 
refugee situations may become de facto stateless as they do not possess the nationality 
of their host state but cannot claim nationality in their country of origin due to fear of 
persecution. Furthermore, South Africa has been hesitant to grant refugees citizenship 
even if they are legally entitled to it.144 Children born to parents with permanent 
residency may also become stateless as they might not qualify for nationality in both 
 
140 UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No 109 (2009). 
141 Article 34 of the UN Refugee Convention requests that the process  be expedited and , amongst others, 
the fees  be lowered. 
142 Council of Europe “Explanatory report to the European agreement on the transfer of responsibility for 
refugees” (16 X 1980) European Treaty Series No 107. 
143 Immigration Act i3 of  2002. 
144 Mulowayi and others v Minister of Home Affairs and another 2019 (4) BCLR 496 (CC). 
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their host and home state.145 A strong commitment to naturalisation is an appropriate 
solution for these cases. For example, refugee children born in South Africa may be 
denied the nationality of their parents.146 Naturalisation is strongly recommended in 
these instances where refugees or permanent residents are in danger of becoming 
stateless.  
 
9.1 Naturalisation for refugees is a contentious issue.  
Naturalisation is increasingly becoming a contentious issue as more and more Western 
States are concerned about maintaining and securing national borders.147 Not only have 
States sought “to implement more restrictive asylum regimes that prevent ‘bogus’ 
applicants and grant refuge only to the ‘deserving’”,148 governments are also  adopting 
systems that include stricter tests for citizenship which make it more difficult for 
refugees to gain citizenship because of their vulnerable status. South Africa is, for 
example, proposing  delinking  citizenship and refugee status.149 Refugees will never be 
able to apply for naturalisation in terms of this recent government proposal.  
 
Refugees, unfortunately, have become tied to broader debates on general 
migration and race relations policies, and are often portrayed as a threat to national 
security.150 Regrettably, this has led to the move from granting permanent refugee 
status to granting refugee status for a limited period. This system takes away the basis 
on which refugees build their lives – the certainty of their status.  
 
Like other nations, South Africa is looking at separating refugee status from 
citizenship. Recent efforts to reform South African refugee policy suggest a shift to a 
more restrictive approach to naturalisation for refugees. The 2017 White Paper seeks to 
achieve this. It states that “there should be no automatic progression from residency to 
citizenship in law or in practice. That is, the process of granting residency (short-term 
and long-term) and citizenship will be delinked”.151 It further states: 
 
 
145 DGLR and another v Minister of Home Affairs and others (GPJHC) unreported case of 3 July 2014. 
146 Manby (2016) at 53. Manby notes: " In some cases, though nationality may be transmitted to those 
born outside the country, there are additional requirements either to take positive steps to claim the right 
to nationality or to notify the authorities of the birth. These provisions, while in principle acceptable, may 
leave some children stateless, since they are often little known and if nationality is not claimed within the 
relevant time limits the right may be lost. It may also be very difficult to fulfil the requirements in 
practice, especially where the country of the parents’ nationality has no diplomatic representation in their 
country of residence." 
147E J “Migration crisis in the EU: developing a framework for analysis of national security and defence 
strategies” (2018) 6 Comparative Migration Studies 28. 
148 Stewart E & Mulvey G “Seeking safety beyond refuge: the impact of immigration and citizenship policy 
upon refugees in the UK” (2014) 40 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1023 at 1023. 
149 DHA “White paper on international migration” (2017). 
150 See Stewart  & Mulvey  (2014) at 1024. 
151 DHA “White paper on the international migration” (2017) at 42.  
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“Steps should be taken to ensure due weight is given to the value of the status of 
residence and of citizenship, including the level of approval necessary. The process 
for awarding citizenship should ensure that rights and responsibilities are 
explained, understood; and ensure that the conditions attached to them are 
accepted by those to whom the status is conferred.”152 
 
With this approach, citizenship is clearly seen as a prestigious status.153 Its 
function is mainly to control access to the Nation and, within such a framework, 
refugees are excluded.  The 2017 White Paper also states that the granting of citizenship 
should be considered exceptional, and thus, a list of those who have applied for 
citizenship through naturalisation shall be approved by the responsible Minister and 
published periodically.154  
 
The 2017 White Paper views South Africa’s approach to residency or 
naturalisation as being “mechanical and compliance-based”, and not tailored to achieve 
specific strategic goals, such as building the nation. It states: 
“ In South Africa there is a misconception that immigrants have a constitutional 
right to progress towards residency or citizenship status (naturalisation). A 
sovereign State has the prerogative to determine who enters its territory, control 
migration patterns relating to the country and enact laws to regulate such 
migration.”155  
 
In short, the White Paper represents the greatest assertion of sovereignty over 
naturalisation since 1993. The White Paper is clearly inconsistent with international 
law, which urges States to naturalise and assimilate refugees who cannot be returned to 







The UN Refugee Convention’s assertion of naturalisation is not a strongly stated right, 
and as such, States have significant leeway in their implementation thereof.  South 
Africa has included a path to naturalisation in its legislation, but this article 
demonstrates the complexities involved in accessing this right. Consequently, refugees 
have been in South Africa as refugees for a long period of time without being able to 
 
152 DHA “White paper on international migration” (2017) at 43. 
153 Masumbe P S The process of naturalisation of refugees under international and South African law and its 
implications for human rights (unpublished PhD thesis, Nelson Mandela School of Law, 2015).  
154 DHA “White paper on international migration” (2017) at 41. 
155 DHA “White paper on international migration” (2017) at 41. 
156 See Hathaway (2005) at 978. 
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successfully access this right or access it with great difficulty. The cumbersome three-
step process spread across three pieces of legislation and the complicated manner in 
which they are regulated and administered are further evidence that South Africa has 
not committed to Article 34 in good faith. Furthermore, the administrative bodies 
responsible for facilitating access to permanent residence and naturalisation have 
interpreted the law in such a harsh manner that it has made these pathways 
superfluous at times or stalled the process for an inordinately and unreasonably long 
time. It is evident that the special vulnerabilities157 of refugees were not taken into 





Botha C Statutory interpretation: an introduction for students 3rd ed (Cape Town: Juta 
1997).  
Goodwin-Gill G & McAdam J The refugee in international law 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2007). 
Haddad E The refugee in international society: between sovereigns (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2008).  
Hathaway J C & Foster M The law of refugee status 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2014).  
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511998300 
Hathaway J C The rights of refugees under international law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2005).  
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614859  
Kellway E A Principles of legal interpretation of statutes, contracts and wills ( Oxford: 
Butterworths 1995).  
Khan F & Schreier T Refugee law in South Africa (Cape Town: Juta 2014). 
Loescher G The UNHCR in world politics: a perilous path (Oxford : OUP  2001).  
https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246912.001.0001  
 
Loescher G, Milner J, Newman E & Troeller G (eds) Protracted refugee situations: 
political, human rights and security implications (Tokyo, New York, Paris : UN University 
Press 2008).  
 
157 Union of Refugee Women and Others v Director, Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority and 
Others, BCLR 339 (CC) para 29. 
 
ART 34 OF THE UN REFUGEE CONVENTION 
 
Page | 95  
 
Manby B Citizenship law in Africa: a comparative study 3rd ed (New York: Open Society 
Foundations 2016). 
Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford : Oxford University Press 2010). 
 
Chapters in books 
Crush J “Introduction: immigration, human rights & the Constitution” in Crush J (ed) 
Beyond control: immigration & human rights in a democratic South Africa (Cape Town: 
South African Migration Project (1998).  
Hansen R ”State controls : borders, refugees, and citizenship”  in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh E, 
Loescher G, Long K & Sigona N (eds) The Oxford handbook of refugee and forced 
migration studies  (Oxford : Oxford University Press 2014). 
 
Journal Articles  
Bhamjee A & Klaaren J "Legal problems facing refugees in Johannesburg" (2005) 17(4) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 827 . 
Brown S K & Bean F D "Assimilation models, old and new: explaining a long-term 
process" (2006) Migration Information Source 3. 
Estevens, J. "Migration crisis in the EU: developing a framework for analysis of national 
security and defence strategies" (2018) 6 Comparative Migration Studies 28 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-018-0093-3  
Gibney M "A 'well-founded fear' of persecution" (1998) 10(1) Human Rights Quarterly 
109 
https://doi.org/10.2307/761976 
Grahl-Madsen A "The status of refugees in international law vol II: asylum, entry, and 
sojourn" (1973) 49 (3) International Affairs 453 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2616857  
Hathaway J "Refugee law is not immigration law" (2002) World Refugee Survey 38. 
Hathaway J C "The global cop-out on refugees" (2018) 30 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 591 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey062  
Hathaway J et al "Introduction" (2013) 26 Journal of Refugee Studies 323 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fet022  
 
Reinhold, S "Good faith in international law" (2013) (2) UCLJLJ 40. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2269746  
 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 96  
 
Snauwaert B, Soenens B, Vanbeselaere N & Boen F "When integration does not 
necessarily imply integration: different conceptualizations of acculturation orientations 
lead to different classifications" (2003) 34 Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 231 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022102250250   
Stewart E & Mulvey G "Seeking safety beyond refuge: the impact of immigration and 
citizenship policy upon refugees in the UK" (2014) 40 Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 1023 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.836960  
Teitelbaum M "The role of the state in international migration" (2002) 8 The Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 157 
 
Legislation  
Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. 
Department of Home Affairs “Draft of green paper on international migration” ( GN 849 
in GG 18033 of 30 May 1997 ). 
Department of Home Affairs “White Paper on international migration” ( GN 750  in GG 
41009 of 28 July 2017 ).  
Department of Home Affairs Immigration Regulations 2014 ( GNR 413 of 22 May 2014 
in GG 37679 ). 
Immigration Act 13 of 2002. 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, chap 27, SC 2001, § 108(4) (Can). 
Refugees Act 130 of 1998. 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
South African Citizenship Amendment Act 17 of 2010. 
US Immigration Regulations, 8 CFR. § 208.13(b)(l)(iii)(a) (2005). 
 
Cases  
Abdulaahi and others v The Director General of Home Affairs and others (WCC) 
unreported case no 7705/2013. 
Ahmed and others v Minister of Home Affairs and another (2018) (12) BCLR 1451 (CC). 
Akanakimana v Chairperson of the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs and others 
(2015) ZAWCHC 17. 
AOL v Minister of Home Affairs and others 2006 (2) SA 8 (D). 
Arguello-Garcia v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993) 21 
Immigration Law Reports (2d) 285 (FCTD). 
ART 34 OF THE UN REFUGEE CONVENTION 
 
Page | 97  
 
Bukasa v Minister of Home Affairs (WCC) unreported case no 22197/10. 
DGLR and another v the Minister of Home Affairs and others (GPJHC) unreported case of 3 
July 2014. 
Eisenberg and others v Director-General Home Affairs and others 2012 (3) SA 508 (WCC). 
 
Fang v Refugee Appeal Board and others 2007 (2) SA 447 (T). 
INS v Cordoza-Fonseca 480 US 421 (1987) 453. 
Katsshingu v The Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs and others (WCC) unreported 
case no 19726/2010 (2 November 2011). 
Khosa & others v Minister of Social Development and others 2004 (6) SA 505. 
Kotzé v Minister of Health and another 1996 (3) BCLR 417 (T). 
Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd  2010 (5) SA 137 (SCA).  
Mayongo v Refugee Appeal Board and others (2007) JOL 19645 (T).  
Mulowayi and others v Minister of Home Affairs and another 2019 (4) BCLR 496 (CC). 
Nkosi v Canada (1993) FCJ 629 (Can. FC, Jun. 23, 1993). 
The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v United States of America) 
(Award) [1910] XI RIAA . 
The Somali Association of South Africa and others v the Chairperson of the Standing  
Committee for Refugee Affairs (WCC) unreported case no 18655/14 (case withdrawn). 
Treadwell and another v Roberts 1913 WLD 54. 
UK House of Lords Hoxha judgement/ R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex 
parte Hoxha, [2002] EWCA Civ (CA 2002). 
Union of Refugee Women v Director, Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 
(4) SA 395 (CC) . 
Van Garderen NO v Refugee Appeal Board (TPD) unreported case no 30720/2006 (19 
June 2007). 
Vansa Vanadium SA Ltd v Registrar of Deeds and others 1997(2) SA 784 (T). 
 
Treaties and Conventions  
 
Refugee Convention Travaux Preparatoires’, 1995. 
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 189 UNTS 150. 
UNHCR Executive Committee “Local integration and self-reliance” (33rd Meeting, 2 June 
2005) EC/55/SC/CRP.15.  
 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 98  
 
UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No 104 (LVI) on Local Integration (2005) UN 
GA Doc A/AC/.96/1021 7 October 2005. 
UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No 109 (LXI) on Protracted Refugee Situations 
(2009) UN GA Doc A/AC.96/1080. 
 
UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , 16 
December 1966, United Nations Treaty Series, vol 999.  
 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 
A (III). 
 
Internet Sources  
Grahl-Madsen “A commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 articles 2-11, 13-37” 
(1997) available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/4785ee9d2.html  (accessed 20 
June 2019). 
South African Police Service “Police clearance certificates: Applying for a police 
clearance certificate (PCC)” available at 
https://www.saps.gov.za/services/applying_clearence_certificate.php (accessed 17 
February 2017). 
UNHCR "Refugee protection and mixed migration: the point plan in action" (2007) 
available at https://www.unhcr.org/50a4c2b09.pdf  (accessed 17 February 2017). 
UNHCR “Handbook and guidelines on procedures and criteria for determining refugee 
status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees” (December 2011) HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3 available at 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/752983  (accessed 18 March 2017). 
UNHCR “Note on standard and burden of proof in refugee claims” (16 December 1998) 
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3338.html   (accessed 5 May 2016). 
UNHCR “Positive Steps Forward in the Field of Citizenship” (2006) BiH press release 
available at http://www.unhcr.ba/press/2006pr/030806.htm (accessed 22 October 
2016). 
UNHCR “The cessation clauses: Guidelines on their application” (1999) available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c06138c4.html (accessed 2 February 2013). 
UNHCR “Voluntary Repatriation International Protection Handbook”  (1996) available 
at https://www.unhcr.org/afr/publications/legal/3bfe68d32/handbook-voluntary-
repatriation-international-protection.html  (accessed 17 July 2019). 
UNHCR “The Rule of Law, Equality and Non-discrimination” available at 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/human-rights/equality-and-non-
discrimination/   (accessed 20 June 2019). 
ART 34 OF THE UN REFUGEE CONVENTION 
 
Page | 99  
 
UNHCR  “Local Integration” available at  https://www.unhcr.org/local-integration-
49c3646c101.html  (accessed 21 June 2019). 
UNHCR “ Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and 
Recommendations “ (June 2006) available at 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/44bb9b684.html  (accessed 21 June 2019). 
 
 
Van Heuven Goedhart G J Refugee Problems and Their Solutions (1955) address of 
UNHCR at Oslo on 12-12-1955 available at 
https://www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/3ae68fb918/refugee-problems-solutions-
address-dr-gerrit-jan-van-heuven-goedhart-united.html  (accessed 20 June 2019). 
VFS Global “Visa fees at a glance” available at 
https://www.vfsglobal.com/dha/southafrica/visa-fees-at-glance.html  (accessed 8 
September 2016). 
UNHCR “The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux préparatoires analysed with 
commentary by Dr. Paul Weis” (1990) available at 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/53e1dd114.html  (accessed 20 June 2019) . 
 
Reports  
Amit R No way in: barriers to access, service and administrative justice at South Africa’s 
refugee reception offices ACMS Research Report (2012).  
Amit, R Queue here for corruption: measuring irregularities in South Africa’s asylum 




Masumbe P S The process of naturalisation of refugees under international and South 
African law and its implications for human rights ( unpublished PhD thesis, Nelson 
Mandela School of Law, 2015). 
 
Unpublished sources  
 
Hathaway J “Refugee law challenges: a conversation with James Hathaway” 
presentation delivered at the University of Cape Town (2019). 
 
 
 
